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This report presents the results of the Dutch case studies carried out for the project 
‘networked coordination of industrial relations (NETWIR)’. This project aims to use social 
network analysis as a tool to gain insight in coordination of collective bargaining in four 
countries: the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland and Spain. It is set-up as an explorative study, as 
social network analysis has seldom been applied to study collective bargaining. Therefore, 
this report should be read as a presentation of results as well as an evaluation of the method 
of social network analysis to study this topic. We first provide background to the context of 
industrial relations in the Netherlands and to the means of coordination of industrial 
relations that have been common over the last decades (section 1.1) and information on a 
social network approach to coordination of collective bargaining (section 1.2) Next, we give 
an overview of the literature that applies social network analysis to industrial relations in 
the Netherlands or use it as an analytical concept (section 2). Thereafter, we discuss the 
methodology used and describe the process of data collection (section 3), before we move 
on to presenting our case studies. In section 4, we apply the methodology to two sector 
cases: the pharmaceutical industries (4.1) and the supermarket sector (4.2). Here we will 
also present some comparative information from the other three countries involved in the 
NETWIR project. In section 5 we compare the two cases and section 6 presents conclusions. 
 
1.1. Coordination of collective bargaining in The Netherlands 
 
In many ways, the Dutch labour relations system can be characterised as a neo-corporatist 
system where trade unions and employers’ organisations have a central role in the 
regulation and management of the labour market (De Beer and Keune 2018; Visser and 
Hemerijck 1999; Keune 2016). The main peak organisations in this system are the 
employers’ organisations VNO-NCW, MKB and AWVN as well as the trade unions FNV, CNV 
and VCP. They lay the basis for this system through widespread collective bargaining, 
covering around 80 percent of all employees. Collective bargaining takes place mainly at 
the sector level and to a minor extent at the company level. In addition, an important share 
of the sector agreements is extended to the companies not part to the agreement by the 
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs. At the peak level there are also two important 
deliberative bodies where employers and trade unions are active. One is the bi-partite 
Labour Foundation where workers and employers discuss about the labour market and 
labour relations, exchange information and communicate points of view to the government 
and to their own members. The other is the tri-partite Socioeconomic Council, which gives 
advice to the government on social and economic policy. Moreover, employers and trade 
unions manage the occupational pension funds and are involved in numerous other labour 
market related organisations. 
Whereas this constellation of institutions has on the surface been relatively stable 
for many decades, this does not mean that the system functions in the same way. Over time 
some important changes have taken place, including first and foremost increasingly 
unequal power relations between unions and employers, in favour of the latter (De Beer and 
Keune 2018). This is expressed in collective agreements and public policy that foster 
continuous wage moderation, a strong increase in flexible and insecure employment 





of employees that are covered by collective agreements that are not signed by the largest 
trade union, the FNV. This, however, in a context of high employment rates, in part a result 
from the fact that more than half of the employees works part-time and that there has been 
a strong growth of self-employment.  
In the highly institutionalised Dutch labour market labour there has traditionally 
been ample space for the alignment of interests through coordination both between the 
union and employer sides, within the union side and within the employers’ side. Within the 
Labour Foundation unions and employers produce recommendations or agreements that is 
supposed to be incorporated into collective bargaining at sector and company level. Also, 
the peak level unions and employers’ organisations produce yearly policy documents on 
terms of employment (working conditions agenda’s) that aim to give direction to the 
bargaining positions of their members that negotiate collective agreements. The peak level 
unions do this separately while the three employers’ organisations do it jointly. In these 
documents they give their analysis of the labour market and labour relations and produce 
proposals and guidelines for their members. These are generally broad framework 
proposals that can then be adapted to the needs and possibilities of the various sectors and 
companies. The FNV also sets a yearly central wage demand, indicating the wage increase 
it expects its members to pursue in the bargaining processes. Until 2013 this was a 
maximum wage demand, based largely on the sum of productivity and inflation, indicating 
the available ‘wage space’. This central wage demand was, with some differentiation, 
followed quite well in the various sectors (Verhoeff 2016). It resulted in many years of wage 
moderation and a falling wage share. Since 2013, the FNV rather tries to increase the wage 
share again by setting higher wage demands. For example, in 2019, the central wage 
demand was of 5 percent.  
At the sector and company level, collective bargaining often involves more than one 
trade union and traditionally the unions try to come to a unified bargaining position. Over 
the years, however, there seem to be more and more cases where they do not manage to 
achieve such a common position (De Beer and Keune 2018). On the employers’ side 
coordination takes place as well although here more often there is only one party at the 
negotiating table. Where bargaining takes place at the company level, in cases of 
multinationals, coordination of the employer bargaining position takes place through the 
mother company, which defines much of the boundaries within which the company can 
negotiate.  
There is however not much research done on if coordination effectively takes place and 
between which players, in which way it works exactly, and what the role of both 
organisations and individuals is. The present study aims to shed more light on this by 
providing an analysis of the social networks involved in collective bargaining in the 
supermarket and pharmaceuticals sectors, the process of collective bargaining in these 
sectors and of the extent and ways of coordination of the bargaining process.  
 
1.2. Collective bargaining, coordination and social networks1  
 
Coordination of collective bargaining, and in particular, wage-setting coordination is 
considered a critical variable in order to understand how collective bargaining systems work 
and what is their impact on economic performance (Calmfors 1998, Hancké and Soskice 
 





2003). There have been developed several measures to capture coordination, such as scale 
measures (Hall and Franzese, 1998; Soskice, 1990), a categorical score (Kenworthy, 2001) 
and most recently a multidimensional measure by J. Visser in the ICTWSS database. 
Notwithstanding the increase in number and quality of collective bargaining coordination 
measures, they nonetheless suffer from similar problems. In particular, the way in which 
coordination has been assessed and measured reproduces some of the shortcomings of 
previous indexes of collective bargaining centralization, as their focus is on the structures. 
Adopting a structural perspective on coordination, misses the behavioural and relational 
dimension that is key to understand how actors coordinate in the bargaining system. 
 The analysis of collective bargaining coordination, including most indexes and 
scores, have tended to focus on its vertical dimension, i.e., on the relationship between 
actors at different levels in the collective bargaining structure. However, collective 
bargaining coordination in many countries has also a strong horizontal dimension. By 
horizontal coordination we mean coordination between collective bargaining units in similar 
levels. This form of coordination can take several forms, pattern bargaining being the most 
frequent. Pattern bargaining defines a situation where a certain firm or industry sets the 
pattern for sequential negotiations in other firms or sectors (Traxler et al. 2008, Marshall 
and Merlo 2004). This coordination can take place for instance between companies (intra-
industry pattern bargaining), sectors (inter-industry pattern bargaining) or even regions. The 
most well-known examples of horizontal coordination is the pattern-bargaining system in 
Germany (with the role of the Metalworkers collective agreement) and Japan (with the 
Spring offensive).  
 In this project we propose a ‘behavioural and relational approach’ to study 
coordination in collective bargaining to do more justice to the horizontal dimension of 
coordination besides the vertical dimension. The relational view on coordination pays 
attention to the actual roles and interactions of actors, not their formal attributions in the 
collective bargaining structure. In this vein, the relational approach towards collective 
bargaining coordination focuses on the analysis of interactions / connections between 
different actors at different levels and through different instances that allow to coordinate 
collective bargaining processes and outcomes. 
 In order to explore the coordination of collective bargaining from a relational point 
of view, the NETWIR project applies the methodology and analytical tools of social networks. 
Social Network Analysis allows processing, analysing and visualizing relations between 
different actors (individuals or organisations) and patterns of connections within their 
populations. The micro-level foundations of social networks are concerned with people 
choosing to interact with one another in various ways. Such small-scale decisions aggregate 
to more meso-level social structures that can hinder or facilitate collective action by groups 
and organizations, such as coordination in collective bargaining. Actors usually interact in 
different policy arenas and for different purposes. In this project, the focus is on those 
relations established in order to sign collective agreements. In order to understand 
coordination and how information flows from one actor to the other we need to know the 
structure of the networks, what the processes of collective bargaining look like and what 








2. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS IN THE LITERATURE ON 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Social network analysis has hardly been applied to the study of collective bargaining 
coordination. The only study that has applied this methodology has been Svensson and 
Öberg (2005). In their work, these authors try to understand how coordination really works 
in one of the countries that systematically ranks high in coordination indexes and scores, 
i.e., Sweden. In particular, through the use of social network methodology, they study 
whether coordination results from trust relations between actors or rather it relies on power 
and hierarchy. 2  
The social network approach has also very scarcely been applied in the wider field 
of industrial relations. This is also true for studies that focus on the Netherlands. There are 
only a few studies that used an empirical social network approach to industrial relation. 
Insofar, it has mainly been applied to the topic of strikes. More specifically, to study the 
diffusion of strikes across the economy (Jansen, Sluiter and Akkerman 2016) and to study 
peer influence in protest participation (Born, Akkerman and Thommes 2016). There are 
however some further studies that discuss the concepts of social networks and informal 
relations in the industrial relations system in the Netherlands without putting it empirically 
to the test. For example, in an article called ‘The Dutch miracle: Institutions, networks and 
trust’ (den Butter & Mosch, 2003), the authors analyse the importance of informal networks 
and trust in the Dutch system and its macro-economic outcomes. Moreover, in 2005 Agnes 
Akkerman published an article entitled ‘Verhoudingen tussen de sociale partners in 
Nederland anno 2005: corporatisme of lobbyisme?’ [Relations between the social partners 
in the Netherlands anno 2005: corporatism or lobbyism?] in which she analyses to what 
extend informal lobby activities have replaced formal industrial relations. She concludes 
that in the Dutch context, unlike in the Scandinavian context, we find little proof for such a 
transition taking place. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1. Case selection 
 
To empirically study the process of collective bargaining, the network of the people involved 
and what this means for coordination, two sectors were selected that serve as case studies: 
the supermarkets sector and the pharmaceutical industries. The supermarket sector in the 
Netherlands is covered by two collective agreements. One for the larger companies: the 
‘VGL’ collective agreement and one for smaller companies and franchise holders: the 
‘Supermarkets’ collective agreement. For this study, the negotiation process for the CBAs 
of the years 2017-2019 was observed and analysed.  
The pharmaceutical industry, on the other hand, is one of the sectors in the 
Netherlands that does not have a sectoral level collective agreement. The larger companies 
in the sector, especially those with a production plant in the Netherlands, often have a 
 





company level agreement in place however. In order to decide which companies are part of 
the pharmaceutical industry, we used the NACE code3  of the company. The Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment registers all collective agreements in the Netherlands. This 
list of collective agreements is publicly available and can be searched based on NACE 
codes. It can be found at: https://www.uitvoeringarbeidsvoorwaardenwetgeving.nl/. 
According to this database, there are currently 11 collective agreements in the sector4 . We 
selected three of those companies with a company level agreement to study more closely. 
We studied the negotiation process of the collective agreements in place at the time the 
study took place (2018/2019).  
 
3.2. The sample 
 
For social network analysis to be meaningful it is important to include all the actors that are 
involved in collective bargaining. A first step of the process was therefore to map out all 
these actors. To get to such a complete overview, we interviewed key experts in both 
sectors. The aim was twofold. First, we wanted to get a better understanding of the sectors. 
Second, we wanted to gather a complete list of all actors involved in collective bargaining 
and related processes of coordination in the sectors under study, as well as a list of all the 
events where they met during negotiation process. Table 1 gives an overview of the expert 
interviews held. Less interviews were needed for the supermarket sector as there is a 
sectoral level collective agreement in place, whereas more were needed in the 
pharmaceutical industries because we included several company level collective 
agreements. No real problems were encountered to get participants for the expert 
interviews. In general, people were willing to participate. At the start, it was hard to get hold 
of some individuals that had moved on to a new job. However, we managed to get hold of 
them in the end. In one of the pharmaceutical industry companies the expert we interviewed 
was quite reluctant to provide the detailed information asked about individuals involved in 
the collective bargaining process and the events that took place. Details were provided after 
extensive explanation why this is necessary to be able to apply the method of social network 
analysis. 
 
Table 1: Overview of the number of expert interviews held 
 Supermarkets  Pharmaceuticals  
Employers’ side 1 3 
Trade unions 1 7 
 
 
As a second step, a questionnaire was developed based on the information 
gathered in the expert interviews. The questionnaire was to be send to all actors in the 
network in order to capture the network and its features. In other words, to collect the social 
network data. The information used in the questionnaires to ask people about the network 
in the format of closed questions -regarding the actors involved and the meetings that took 
place- was double-checked by some of the interviewed experts.  
 
3 For the pharmaceuticals we used NACE-code 21 
4 Apotex Nederland BV; Astellas Pharma Europe BV; Biohorma BV; Codi International BV; DSM; 
Momentive Speciality Chemicals BV; Johnson Diversey Nederland; Katwijk Chemie BV; Kisuma 





Third, the consent to participation in the second part of the research was requested 
from the interviewed experts. We also asked their help in gathering the contact details of 
the other people involved in the negotiation process to approach them with the 
questionnaire. In this phase of the study, one of the companies studied in the 
pharmaceutical industry dropped out.  
Fourth, the questionnaire was distributed through SurveyMonkey to all individuals 
that were indicated by the experts as individuals that influenced the negotiation 
process/were part of the negotiation process at some point and were as such identified as 
part of the social network.  Each individual was sent a personal invitation with a 
personalized message in order to try to enlarge the response rate. When contact 
information was gathered through somebody else this was mentioned. A semi-automatic 
reminder was scheduled for 10 days after the initial invitation. When we got no response 
after having sent the reminder, we tried to establish contact through email and/or 
telephone. A lot of effort was put in to getting as many responses as possible as social 
network analysis is only meaningful of the network is almost complete/ Table 2 gives an 
overview of the responses and non-responses. The response rate in the pharmaceutical 
industries was 74 percent and in supermarket sector 62 percent.   
 
3.3. Evaluation of the data collection 
 
As table 2 shows, an obvious problem of applying social network analysis to the negotiation 
of collective agreements is the fact that most of the actors in the network need to fill out 
the questionnaire. This turned out problematic, both for influential and less influential 
people in the network, which makes the process vulnerable. Actors have a hard time seeing 
the direct benefits of participation in this type of research for them. If such an approach is 
further developed in the future, close attention should be paid to questions the actors 
themselves want to see answered through this type of research. We nevertheless decided 
to go forward with the information obtained through the questionnaire and present it in this 
report. For ethical reasons, information about people that themselves did not respond to 
the questionnaire is removed from most of the analyses: after all they themselves did not 
give consent to use the information. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with care: 
after all, they only tell us something about that part of the network that filled out the 
questionnaire. For these reasons, where possible and needed, the results are cross-
validated with information from the semi-structured interviews.  
 
Table 2: Responses to the questionnaire 
 Supermarkets/VGL Pharma 1 Pharma 2 
Response 13 11 17 
Refused 5 3 0 
No response after 
contact 
3 0 1 
No contact 
information  
0 0 0 
Impossible to contact 
pension/no longer 
employed in the 
sector 
0 0 2 







4. SECTORAL ANALYSIS  
 
We now turn to presenting the case studies. First the pharmaceutical industries are 
discussed followed by the supermarket sector. For each case, we start with a short 
description of the socio-economic situation, followed by a description of the collective 
bargaining structure. Before turning to what coordination looks like in both sections, we 
describe how collective bargaining takes place in the sectors with regard to three different 
characteristics which we will now describe.  
We first focus on what the network looks like. More specifically, we look into the 
size of the network, the number of parties involved and how many actors are seen as 
influential. Potentially, collective bargaining is more complex as the number of parties and 
people involved is larger. This is however not the whole story. Also, in large networks 
collective bargaining might not be that complicated if the power is situated in only a few 
actors, as long as they have not very opposing positions. Alternatively, when the power is 
diffused over many actors reaching consent in collective bargaining might become more 
difficult.  
Second, we look into the processes of collective bargaining in the sectors to gain 
insight in the degree of formality, as a more informal process of bargaining may leave room 
for horizontal coordination taking place between individuals or groups outside the official 
bargaining setting. More specifically we look into the importance of different types of 
interactions (formal or informal), what the roles are of the actors that are perceived as most 
important and the possibility of individual actors to exercise influence beyond their formal 
role.  
Third, we focus on the role of trade unions and employers in the network to discuss 
what the position of the two opposing parties is in the network and within the negotiations. 
More specifically, we look into whether there are structural differences in influence and 





4.1.1.  Socio-economic situation of the sector 
 
The pharmaceutical industry in the Netherlands contributes about 0.4 percent to the Dutch 
economy (CBS, 2018) and is currently made up of about 200 companies (see figure 1). 
Recently the number of companies in the sector has been on the rise. Most of it can be 
attributed to a growth in small companies, often with only one person working. The number 
of larger companies has been rather stable over time. There are three types of companies 
present in the sector: those that produce specialité medicines, those that produce generic 
medicines and bioscience firms (source: interview employer pharmaceuticals). Many of the 
large companies are multinationals. Big names in the pharmaceutical industry in the 
Netherlands are for example MSD, TEVA and Astellas.  
If we than look at the number of workers in the sector (figure 2), we see that there 
has been a dip in between 2010 and 2013 but that their numbers have been on the increase 





is female5 . The gap between number of workers and the full time equivalent in the sector 
is relatively small, meaning that most workers are employed on a full-time contract. 
Working conditions in the sector are of a high standard. Interviewees mention that this is 
the case because the profits in the sector tend to be high. Moreover, the wage sum is low 
compared to other expenditures, for example on equipment. The interviewees indicate that 
only companies that have a production plant have a collective agreement. Other companies 
tend to have a working conditions agreement instead.   
 
Figure 1: Number of companies in the pharmaceutical industry in the Netherlands 
  
Source: Statline, 2019 
Note: SBI2008 code 21 
 
Figure 2: number of workers and fte in the pharmaceutical industry in the Netherlands 
(x1.000) 
  
Source: Statline, 2019 
 
5 Source: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2016/16/kleinere-rol-nederlandse-farmaceutische-


























Note: SBI2008 code 21 
 
4.1.2. Single-employer collective bargaining  
 
All collective agreements in the pharmaceutical industry are company level agreements 
and this collective bargaining situation has been rather stable over time. The company level 
agreements that are there have already been around for quite some years and even though 
there have been some take-overs and mergers of companies over time, this has not resulted 
in the abundance of collective agreements. The collective agreements have continued to be 
renegotiated regularly, albeit sometimes under a different name (source: employer 
interviews). It is important to note that most of the companies that have a collective 
agreement in the pharmaceutical industries are multinationals, meaning that the 
bargaining process is conditioned one way or the other by the mother company and that 
there is relatively little bargaining freedom for the Dutch daughter company (source: an 
employer interview in the pharmaceuticals). 
Because all collective agreements in the pharmaceutical industry are company level 
agreements, and also the working conditions agreements that are present in the companies 
where there is no collective agreement in place are company level agreements, the 
predominant form of wage setting is company level bargaining. In all cases the party 
negotiating on behalf of the employer is the employer itself or, more accurately, the 
daughter of the multinational company. During the negotiation process, however, they are 
often supported by the national employers’ organization AWVN. This can be either in person 
by being present at the negotiation rounds or by information provision during -or at the start 
of- the negotiation process (source: interview employers’ organization). The parties signing 
and negotiating the collective agreements on behalf of the employees are the three largest 
trade unions: FNV, CNV and De Unie. Some collective agreements are signed by all three, 
but others are signed by only one or two of them, in some cases complemented by a 
company level trade union.   
 
4.1.3. Survey results 
 
The collective bargaining network 
What then do the networks negotiating the collective agreements look like? In table 3 the 
characteristics of the persons involved in the negotiation process of the two collective 
agreements under study in the pharmaceutical industries are described. The table shows 
that there were in total 34 persons involved. They represent in total seven different parties. 
One party had a technical role in the process and the other six has a political role: there 
were four trade unions involved and two employers. Especially on the side of the trade 
unions this can be regarded as quite many parties. This can potentially be a situation in 
which it is difficult to come to an agreement and a prerequisite for lengthy negotiations. 
This is especially the case when there is no coordination on the union side or no clear task 
division and everybody wants to have their say. If we look at the responses to the 
questionnaire we see that the persons involved in collective bargaining in the two 
pharmaceutical companies under study score the item ‘fragmentation in the representation 
of workers or firms’ with a mean value of 3.18 out of 5, which is the highest score out of 
the four possible challenges posed to them (see table 4). This makes the Netherlands 
different from the other countries in this study (Italy, Spain and Ireland), which all rank 





bargaining in the pharmaceutical industries in their country. Table 3 also shows that most 
of the people involved (65.5 percent) were less than 5 years part of the negotiation of the 
collective agreements under study in the Netherlands. This could be an explanation for the 
fact that ‘lack of trust’ as an obstacle in collective bargaining scores slightly higher  in the 
Netherlands than it does in Italy and Spain, where negotiators are generally for a longer 
period of time involved in collective bargaining in the sectors: in Italy, only 15 percent of all 
respondents were less than five years involved and in Spain 30 percent (these numbers are 
a combined percentage for the pharmaceutical industries and the supermarket sector). One 
could assume that trust is generally higher if one knows each other better, although this of 
course also depends on how good relationships are.   
If we then look at who are perceived as most influential by others in the network 
and therefore can be regarded as most powerful, we see that only a few people are seen as 
really influential even though there are so many parties involved: two in the network of the 
first collective agreement (the CNV representative at trade union side  and the HR manager 
at the employer side) and three in the network of the second collective agreement (the CNV 
and FNV representatives at the side of the trade unions and the HR manager at the 
employer side). This finding is confirmed by the information obtained in the interviews 
during which also one or two representatives of trade unions and one person representing 
the employer were generally singled out as very influential. So for this reason, even though 
there are quite a large number of parties involved in collective bargaining, especially on the 
workers’ side, and the representation of workers is therefore perceived as fragmented, 
collective bargaining in the two companies is not as complicated as it would be in case the 
two networks would have less concentration of influence. Although this of course also 
depends on how far apart their viewpoints are: negotiations can still be very difficult if these 
are very far apart.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive characteristics of respondents in the pharmaceutical industries 
Characteristic Involved in the 
negotiations 
Respondents to the 
questionnaire 
Number of people 34 29 
Number of parties 7 7 
Gender of respondents   
     Male 74% 72% 
    Female 26% 28% 
Side of    
    Employer 44% 38% 
    Trade Union 56% 62% 
Role   
   Political 97% 97% (of which 35% are 
trade union members) 
   Technical 3% 3% 
Involvement in wage setting in this 
sector 
  
   <5 years - 65.5% 










Table 4: Ranking of challenges to collective bargaining 
Challenge for collective bargaining Mean value assigned (scale 1-5) 
 The 
Netherlands 
Italy Spain Ireland 
Lack of trust 3 2.38 2.50 3.44 
Power differences 2.93 2.63 2.70 3.22 
Fragmentation in the representation of workers 
or firms 
3.18 3.13 2.75 2.56 
Obstacles from economic and/or sectorial 
context 
2.39 3.63 4.14 4.22 
   
 
The process of collective bargaining 
And what does the process of collective bargaining look like: how formal is the process of 
collective bargaining in the pharmaceutical industries in the Netherlands? The system of 
collective bargaining as applied in the pharmaceutical industries is described by the 
participants of the semi-structured interviews as rather standard for the Dutch context and 
as involving quite a bit of formality. Before the formal negotiations start, the employer 
(daughter company) decides for himself what the goals for the negotiation are within the 
boundaries set by the mother company, and the trade unions do the same amongst 
themselves. The various trade unions involved discuss their goals together before the 
negotiations start and try to align them. The trade union representatives told during the 
interviews that before negotiations start, they hold meetings among their members within 
the respective firms to find out what their wishes are. These meetings they often hold with 
the members of all different trade unions together. Afterwards, they sit down with the 
representatives of all trade unions to set the goals for the negotiations. They state that in 
this process, both the wishes of the members and the central employment conditions 
agendas of the trade unions involved are important. Also, the central wage demand of the 
FNV is important. This demand is adjusted to the context of the company by their 
representative: if the company is doing well the demand is higher, if it is doing badly, it is 
lower. Within this process of alignment, they leave room for each union to push for the 
issues it regards as important. They bundle all the goals, which is then used as their input 
for the negotiation process.  
After the preparation face, the formal rounds of negotiation start. These formal 
rounds are seen as the core of the process. During these formal rounds, all negotiating 
parties, including some representative trade union members, are present. Here, everything 
that is supposed to go on the record is discussed and said. However, the formal rounds of 
negotiation are often suspended for some time (c.q. breaks), during which negotiating 
parties can speak off the record. Often this is in a smaller group than during the formal 
negotiations. These breaks, during which the negotiation process continues informally, are 
seen as essential to make the process work. They act as the glue. The informal breaks are 
a standard part of every negotiation table. Besides this standard informal discussion, other 
forms of informal contacts take place between negotiating parties. This is seen as 
especially relevant when the negotiation process is stuck or when some difficult obstacles 
need to be navigated. This takes for example the form of bilateral conversations while 
having coffee together during an actual break or phone calls in between two formal 
negotiation rounds. Depending on what is being discussed, these meetings can take the 





negotiations taking place in the pharmaceutical industries is supported by the survey results 
as shown in figure 3. The respondents involved in collective bargaining score formal 
multilateral meetings as the most important type of interaction during the negotiation 
process (mean of 3.38), followed by informal multilateral meetings (mean of 2.75). 
Informal bilateral meetings follow closely (mean of 2.15) and the least important type of 
interaction according to the respondents are formal bilateral meetings (mean of 1.59).  
The mix of various kinds of meetings all being part of the bargaining process raises 
the question where the ‘real’ decisions are made: is this within the formal meetings or 
rather outside this context? If we look at the survey results, we see that there is no 
significant correlation between the number of collective bargaining events people attended 
and their perceived influence (pearson’s correlation = 0.142, p>0.1). This is a first indication 
that there is significant influence on the result exercised outside the context of the formal 
meetings, for example decisions are made by the people in formal roles outside the context 
of the formal meetings and/or the informal meetings are more relevant than the formal 
ones. During the interviews it is confirmed that informal meetings are important besides 
the formal meetings, as interviewees mention that when the process is stuck on important 
issues bilateral meetings either on the phone of in person will get the process going again. 
This is especially the case when relations between negotiators are good, suggesting that 
when relations are bad the process becomes more formal.  
Now the question remains how important the formal hierarchy of roles is. In table 5 
we present measures to get some insight into this question. First of all, we look at who are 
perceived as most influential by others in the network. If we compare this to their roles, we 
see that indeed those with positions formally high up in the hierarchy (representatives of 
large trade unions and HR managers of the firms) are also perceived by others as most 
influential. Interesting here is that not the administrators of all large trade unions involved 
in the negotiation process are seen as highly influential, but that some are singled out. This 
is not always the person of the FNV, which is the largest trade union by far in the 
Netherlands. This could be a reflection of the individual membership structure in the 
companies under study (more members from other trade unions), but could also be an 
indication that the influence of individuals stems from other sources than formal position 
alone. In the interviews was for example mentioned that the level of experience with 
negotiating the specific collective agreement on the table and/or previous experience 
within the company (and therefore network connections) creates influence.  
It is not only a formally high position that creates influence. Also, the position of 
individuals in the network can result in influence. For example, those with connections to 
many others in the network may have an influential position because they can influence a 
large group in the network. Moreover, also those on key positions connecting for example 
one group of people to another group of people can be really influential. These ‘gate 
keepers’ have a strong position for controlling information. It might be the case that those 
with a formally influential position have also a strong position in the network, but this might 
as well be others. Table 5 shows that the number of people in the network with a good 
information position in terms of many connections to others (‘top degree’) or a key 
information position (‘top betweenness’) is larger than the number of people that is 
perceived as influential and do not necessarily overlap: in the network of collective 
agreement 2, the influential persons ‘B’ and ‘E’ are not among the ones with a lot of 
connections or a gate-keeper positions (Table 5). It are others in the network that are in 
those well-connected positions. Figure 4 graphically illustrates the connectivity in the 





process and the lines their contact. The contact between actors is calculated based upon 
the frequency of contact during the negotiation process. If actors had less than 5 contact 
moments, the connection is removed from the picture so that only frequent connections are 
shown. The purpose of removing less frequent contact was to make the picture easier to 
read. The green dots represent representatives from the employers’ side and the purple 
dots people from trade unions’ side. The connectivity in the network of collective agreement 
1 is more equally distributed –everyone is closely connected with everyone -than in 
collective agreement 2 where some are better connected than others. For example, actors 
S, C, M, G and J are connected to many others, whereas actor L is only loosely connected. 
There are no lines connecting this person to others in the network, meaning that he or she 
was with none of the others in contact with a frequency more than 5 times during the 
negotiation process.  The network of collective agreement 2 therefore holds more 
possibilities to hold a critical position to control information (top-betweenness) than the 
network of collective agreement 1, illustrating that positions of influence in this network 
are potentially more dispersed.  
 




Table 5: Influential actors in the bargaining process 
 Most influential 
actors (perceived 
influence) 
Actors with top 
degree  
Actors with top 
betweenness 
Collective 
agreement  1 
C (CNV); D (HR 
manager) 
I; G; H; K; C; D All 
Collective 
agreement  2 
C (FNV); B (HR 
manager); E (CNV) 




























Figure 4: graphical presentation of the network connections 
              
Collective agreement 1    Collective agreement 2 
         
 
Note: The dots represent the actors involved in the negotiation process and the lines their contact. 
The green dots represent representatives from the employers’ side and the purple dots people from 
trade unions’ side. The contact between actors is calculated based upon the frequency of contact 
during the negotiation process. If actors had less than 5 contact moments, the connection is removed 
from the picture so that only frequent connections are shown.  
 
 
The role of unions /employers in the network 
Next, we ask what the network looks like in terms of distribution of influence and 
connections both within the own group and between groups? Respondents do indicate that 
they perceive a difference in power between employers and trade unions and see this is an 
obstacle in the negotiation process: they ranked this obstacle on average with a 2.93 out of 
a possible 5. Nevertheless, this does not show when they have to score the power position 
of others involved in the negotiation process: employer representatives get an average 
score of 3.18 out of 5 and representatives of trade unions 3.19 out of 5. Also, the people in 
the network that are perceived as most influential stem from both sides (see also table 5). 
This seems to indicate a situation where the role of trade unions and employer is perceived 
as fairly balanced. Also, the connections between the two sides are found to be close: the 
average connections (‘tie strength’) between trade unions and employers is almost as 
strong as among trade unionists or among employer representatives (see table 6). This 
means that the density of communication between representatives of trade unions and 
employers is comparable to that within their own group. This is also shown by the networks 
in Figure 5. In the network of collective agreement 1, everyone is so highly connected to 
everyone else that no separate groups can be distinguished. In the network of collective 
agreement 2, two different groups can be distinguished of which the first group exists of 
trade union members and the second group of mainly employer representatives with some 










Table 6: Average tie strength within and between groups 
 Average tie strength 
within employers 
Average tie strength 
within trade unions 
Average tie strength 
between employers 
and trade unions 
CBA 1 6.33 5.95 5.52 
CBA 2 6.13 4.64 4.44 
 
 
Figure 5: Groups and contact between groups in the collective bargaining networks 
                   
Collective agreement 1    Collective agreement 2 
    
 
Note: Subgroups in the network are indicated by the blue field. Subgroups have been computed 
based on Louvain clustering with edge weighting, meaning that the nodes are randomly added and 
removed from clusters until an optimal solution is found. 
 
 
Coordination in the collective bargaining process 
What now do the characteristics of the process of collective bargaining as it takes place in 
the pharmaceutical industries in the Netherlands mean for coordination? First of all, vertical 
coordination. The yearly terms of employment as published by the trade unions at a central 
level and the central wage demand of the FNV means coordination of trade union’s input. 
Also, the negotiation room set by the mother company for their daughters in this industry 
coordinates the process at employers’ side. Second, horizontal coordination at sector level. 
According to the trade union representatives there is little coordination between the 
unionists involved in the different company level collective agreements in the 
pharmaceutical industry. An obvious way to do this would be for a union to have the same 
persons negotiate the collective agreements in the sector or to have the people that 
negotiate the various collective agreements in the pharmaceutical industries sit together to 
coordinate. This is not the case. According to negotiators participating in the semi-
structured interviews, this follows from the organizational structure of the trade unions. If 
they are not organized at the sectoral level and there is no sectoral collective agreement in 
place.  Rather, they are organized by geographical area and there is no structural 
consultation in place among the people negotiating in the sector. At the employers’ side 
there seems to be some coordination. This stems from the national level employers’ 
organization (AWVN) that supports the various employers in the sector during the 
negotiation process (and beyond). This is done by one person, who is therefore able to 





some horizontal coordination in the sector through the presence of pattern setters: 
companies whose example is followed by others. When asked in the survey, the 
respondents in the sector do not seem to agree upon the presence of pattern setters within 
the sector: 65.5 percent states there are no particular companies setting the pace, whereas 
35.5 percent states that there are. Companies mentioned by this latter group as pattern 
setters are MSD, DSM, Astellas and TEVA. Manufacturing is mentioned by 4 respondents as 
an important pattern setting reference industry for the pharmaceutical industries, probably 
because of the presence of production plants. Finally, there is horizontal coordination taking 
place within the context of a company level collective agreement. The various trade unions 
involved align their input for the negotiation. For the employer this does not make sense as 
there is obviously only one employer involved. It could also be the case that there is some 
coordination taking place between employers and trade unions through their 
representatives at the negotiation tables. After all, this study shows that there is quite some 
informal contact during the negotiation process, also between the different parties. This 
contact creates the potential for coordination. Whether this is actually the case depends on 
what is being discussed and how it is done: is it an extension of the negotiations or rather 
coordination that takes place in the informal meetings? More research is needed to answer 
this question.   
 
4.2. Supermarket sector  
 
4.2.1. Socio-economic situation of the sector 
 
The supermarket sector accounts for about 0.9 percent of the total economy in the 
Netherlands6 . Figure 6 shows that the number of companies on the market has been 
rapidly decreasing between 2010 and 2017. This is mainly due to take overs by large retail 
companies. The sector is currently dominated by some large to very large retail companies. 
Albert Heijn is the largest one of them, followed by Jumbo. Other big players are Lidl, Aldi, 
Coop, Plus, Spar and Dirk/Deka.  
Opposite to the trend in the number of companies, the number of workers is on the 
rise and approaching the 350.000 in 2017 (see figure 6). Most of the workers in the sector 
are young. This demographic characteristic of the workforce needs to be understood from 
the minimum-wage regulation in the Netherlands, which is characterized by a long tale of 
youth-minimum wages. Supermarkets have used those to develop a business model that is 
based on a large proportion of young employees and thus low wages. Most of the young 
employees work in the sector besides their studies as a side-job on a part-time basis. This 

















Figure 6: Number of companies in the supermarket sector in the Netherlands 
  
Source: Statline, 2019 
Note: SBI2008 code 4711 
 
 
Figure 7: number of workers and fte in the supermarkets sector in the Netherlands (x1.000) 
  
Source: Statline, 2019 
Note: SBI2008 code 4711 
 
4.2.2. Multi-employer collective bargaining 
 
As mentioned, there are two sectoral level collective agreements in the supermarket sector: 
the VGL collective agreement for the big players in the field and the Supermarkets collective 
agreement for small and medium enterprises (=all others). Both collective agreements are 
negotiated at the same table and they are identical except for pension schemes and early 
pension arrangements. The supermarket agreement is legally extended to the sector. 
Because the negotiation process takes place at the sectoral level, the predominant form of 
wage setting in the sector is sector level bargaining.  
 At the employers’ side there are two employers’ organizations that signed the 
collective agreement for the years 2017-2019: ‘Centraal Bureau Levensmiddelenhandel’ 
for the VGL collective agreement and the ‘Vakcentrum’ for the supermarkets collective 




























largest trade union FNV refused to sign the agreements. They did not sign the previous 
collective agreement either, but did decide to be nevertheless part of the bargaining process 
of the collective agreement under study. However, they did not sign it in the end. That it is 
possible to conclude a collective agreement without the consent of one of the parties 
involved is exemplary for the Dutch context, where it is sufficient to have one trade union 
on board to close a collective agreement, independent of the representativeness of this 
union.  
 
4.2.3. Survey results 
 
The collective bargaining network 
What does the network negotiating the collective agreements look like in the supermarket 
sector in the Netherlands? In table 7, the characteristics of the persons involved in the 
supermarket collective agreements are presented. First of all, the table shows that we have 
to be careful with the interpretation of our results especially for this sector, as the response 
to the questionnaire is selective with regard to several aspects. First, of the four parties that 
signed the collective agreement, only three are represented in our data. The majority of the 
people involved in the negotiation of the collective agreements in the sector is male (76 
percent). In that sense, females are somewhat overrepresented in the people that filled out 
the questionnaire: of them only 69 percent is male. Also, in terms of the side they represent, 
the response to the questionnaire is skewed. Even though of the people involved in 
negotiating the collective agreements 52 percent represents the employers’ side, of the 
respondents to the questionnaire only 23 percent represents the employers. Also, the trade 
union members are somewhat overrepresented in the respondents to the questionnaire, 
whereas those with a political role (negotiators at either the trade union- or employers’ side) 
are underrepresented as opposed to those with a technical role in the process (independent 
chair).  
 If we look at the size of the network in terms of persons and parties to get insight 
into the potential complexity of the bargaining process, we see that in total 21 persons are 
involved in the negotiation of the collective agreements in the supermarket sector. About 
half of them (54 percent) has been involved for less than 5 years, and the others more than 
that. They represent 4 different parties. Most of the large companies in the sector have 
somebody sitting in on the negotiations as well. Two of the parties involved are employers’ 
organizations and the two other parties are trade unions. This situation with four different 
parties involved could potentially complicate the bargaining process. Especially the fact that 
one of the trade unions did not sign the collective agreements although having been part of 
the negotiation process, is an indication that the negotiation process has been difficult. 
Indeed, if we look at how respondents in this sector rated the question about the extent to 
which ‘fragmentation in the representation of workers or firms’ is a challenge, we see that 
this is rated rather high with on average 3.77 out of a possible 5. This is one of the two 
issues with the highest scores out of the four challenges listed as is shown in table 8. The 
other one with such a high score is ‘power differences’. The supermarket sector in the 
Netherlands is somewhat unique in perceiving ‘fragmentation in the representation of 
workers and firms’ as one of the largest challenges to collective bargaining, as table 8 
shows in none of the other countries included in this study, this aspect is seen as the most 
important barrier. Nevertheless, in absolute terms both Italy and Ireland score higher on 





countries (it could be the case that actors in one country just give a higher average score 
due to cultural differences) or only relative scores are comparable.  
If we now look at the distribution of power, we see that only four people in the 
network are seen as very influential (3 trade union representatives and an employer). The 
relatively low number of influential people could be an indication that the bargaining 
process is not as complicated as it would be in case the two networks would have less 
concentration of influence. Although this of course also depends on how far apart their 
viewpoints are: negotiations can still be very difficult if these are very far apart. Interesting 
enough the four listed as most powerful are not representing the four different parties 
involved: three out of four are trade union representatives. It could be that in this instance 
the results are indeed biased as the response rate among trade union representatives was 
much higher than among employers and therefore the results are a stronger reflection of 
trade unionists’ point of view. It can also be a sign, however, that at the trade union side the 
power is more diffused than at the employers’ side where most influence lies in the hands 
of a single employer. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive characteristics of respondents in the supermarket sector 
Characteristic Involved in the 
negotiations 
Respondents to the 
questionnaire  
Number of people 21 13 
Number of parties 4 overarching parties 
+ representatives of 
large firms 
3 
Gender   
     Male 76% 69% 
    Female 24% 31% 
Side   
    Employer 52% 23% 
    Trade Union 43% 69% 
   Other 5% 8% 
Role   
   Political 71% 54% 
   Technical 5% 8% 
   Trade union member 24% 39% 
Involvement in wage setting in this 
sector 
  
   <5 years - 54% 
   >5years - 46% 
 
 
Table 8: Ranking of challenges to collective bargaining in the supermarket sector 
Challenge for collective bargaining Mean value assigned (scale 1-5) 
 The 
Netherlands 
Italy Spain  Ireland 
Lack of trust 3.08 2.58 2.33 3.44 
Power differences 3.77 2.83 3.11 4.00 
Fragmentation in the representation of workers 
or firms 
3.77 4.00 2.56 4.00 
Obstacles from economic and/or sectorial 
context 







The process of collective bargaining 
What did the process of collective bargaining look like in the supermarket sector in the 
Netherlands for the collective agreements 2017-2019? How formal or informal was the 
process of collective bargaining? We focus on the process followed, the place where the 
real decision is made and the possibility of individuals to exercise power beyond their formal 
role.  
 The negotiation process for the supermarket collective agreements for the period 
2017-2019 in the Netherlands was preceded by a lengthy trajectory in which the 
possibilities to completely renew the collective agreement where discussed. This renewal-
trajectory was agreed in the previous collective agreement that was signed by the CNV and 
the employers’ organizations (CBL and Vakcentrum), but not by the FNV. The renewal 
trajectory also took place between the CNV and the employers’ organizations under the 
directions of two external parties. The outcome of the trajectory was a report with ideas and 
recommendations.  
Upon the start of the negotiation process of the collective agreement for the period 
2017-2019, the FNV decided to join the table again. As preparation, the trade unions sat 
together to decide what the joined input for the negotiations would be. It was decided that 
it would be the outcomes of the report of the renewal process together with a wage demand. 
This wage demand was determined together based upon the central wage demands of the 
FNV and the working conditions agenda (which includes a wage range) of the CNV. Also, the 
employers’ organizations prepared the negotiation process together. Before the start, both 
employers’ organizations sat with their members to get a mandate. Also, the two 
employers’ discussed their input for the negotiations to reach a joined starting point.  
Next, the negotiation process started. According to the parties involved, the process 
itself was rather standard. Formal rounds of negotiations were perceived as the centre of 
the negotiation process. During these formal meetings, a delegation of CBL members was 
present (which means representatives of the large supermarkets in the Netherlands) of 
which one was assigned to be the formal spokesperson. Moreover, representatives from 
both employers’ organizations, trade union representatives and trade union members were 
present. Also, an independent chairperson was appointed to manage the process. The 
formal meetings were interrupted regularly to talk more informally in a slightly smaller 
group. Also, one-on-one meetings are seen as important to the process and as essential to 
get the process going again when things got more difficult. This description of the 
negotiation process is supported by the survey results as is shown in figure 6. The results 
show that the respondents in the supermarket sector rank both formal multilateral 
meetings and informal multilateral meetings as equally important (mean of 2.91), followed 
closely by informal bilateral meetings (mean of 2.62). Formal bilateral meetings are seen 
as least important (mean of 1.55). Even though the negotiation process itself was described 
by the people involved as rather standard, the end was quite unexpected. At the very last 
moment, just before the trade union representatives were going to ask their members to 
agree to the negotiated result, the FNV decided at the central level that they were not 
satisfied with the negotiated result and therefore refused to sign. This resulted in collective 
agreements that were, just like the previous ones, only signed by the CNV on the side of the 
trade unions.   
The next question is then where the ‘real’ decisions are made: is this within the 
formal meetings or rather outside the formal setting? The survey result show that there is 





events they attended (pearson’s correlation = 0.413, p>0.1). This is a first careful indication 
that there is quite some influence exercised outside the context of the official meetings, for 
example decisions are made by the people in formal roles outside the context of the formal 
meetings and/or the informal meetings are more relevant than the formal ones. 
 Now the question remains how important the formal hierarchy of roles is: are those 
with formally the highest position also the most influential? If we look at the people in the 
network that are perceived as most influential (see table 9), we see that the people that are 
seen as most important at the trade unions side are the representatives of the trade unions 
involved. Their role thus matches the influence assigned to them. Interestingly enough, the 
person mentioned as most influential at the side of the employers is not a representative 
of an employers’ organization but the representative of an individual company, which is not 
the assigned spokesperson of the VGL-employers either. This is a clear indication that it is 
not the formal role in the negotiation process that matters most. 
 Besides being powerful in the negotiation process because of a formal position, 
individuals can also be influential as a result of their position in the negotiation network. 
For example, those with many connections in the network have the potential to influence 
many others. Moreover, also those on key positions connecting for example one group of 
people to another group of people can be really influential. These ‘gate keepers’ have a 
strong position to control information. Table 9 also indicates who has such influential 
network positions in the supermarket sector. It shows that it are the trade union 
representatives plus a trade union member that have most connections to others in the 
network (‘top degree’) and the best network position to control information (‘top 
betweenness’), but this could be the result of the selective response to the questionnaire in 
which trade union members were overrepresented. This is further graphically illustrated by 
the network-pictures in figure 9. The figure shows the contacts between people in the 
negotiation network of the collective agreements in the supermarket sector. The dots 
represent the actors involved in the negotiation process and the lines their contact. The 
contact between actors is calculated based upon the frequency of contact during the 
negotiation process. If actors had less than 5 contact moments, the connection is removed 
from the picture so that only frequent connections are shown. The purpose of removing less 
frequent contact was to make the picture easier to read. The green dots represent 
representatives from the employers’ side and the purple dots people from trade unions’ 
side.  The picture shows that the actors G, H, I and C have many connections to others and 
also serve as a bridge connecting others in the network (and having thus the possibility to 
control the information flow between these two others). The network picture moreover 
shows that actor G has a very interesting position, as this actor bridges employers (green 






















Table 9: Influential actors in the bargaining process 
Most influential actors (perceived 
influence) 
Actors with top 
degree 
Actors with top 
betweenness 
G (trade union representative);  
H (trade union representative); 
K (employer); 
C  (trade union representative) 
G; H; I; C G; H; I; C 
 
 
Figure 9: Graphical representation of the network 
 
Note: The dots represent the actors involved in the negotiation process and the lines their contact. 
The green dots represent representatives from the employers’ side, the purple dots people from trade 
unions’ side and the yellow dot the independent chair. The contact between actors is calculated 
based upon the frequency of contact during the negotiation process. If actors had less than 5 contact 























The role of trade unions/employers in the network 
The question remains how the power is distributed between employers and trade unions. If 
we look at how the actors perceive power differences, we see that they regard it as an 
important obstacle in the negotiation process: they ranked it with a mean value of 3.77 out 
of a possible 5. If we than look at how powerful the person involved at both sides are 
perceived by the others in the network, we see that the respondents at the employers’ side 
receive a mean influence score of 3.33 and those at the trade unions side a mean influence 
score of 2.94. Overall, the employers side is thus perceived as more influential than the 
trade unions. This fits with the fact that unions have only limited membership in the sector. 
 If we look at how people in the network are connected with each other as presented 
in table 10, we see that there are strong connections among trade unionists (‘average tie 
strength within trade unions’) and also the connections within the group of employer 
representatives are strong (‘average tie strength within employers’). However, the 
connections between the two groups are a lot weaker. This is also shown in figure 10 that 
shows the groups in the network and the ties between the groups. We can see that there 
are two groups in the network: one with only trade union representatives and one with all 
employers, some trade unions member and the independent chair. Interestingly enough the 
independent chair is not the connector of the two groups. 
 
Table 10: Average tie strength within and between groups 
Average tie strength 
within employers 
Average tie strength 
within trade unions 
Average tie strength 
between employers 
and trade unions 
6.33 6.56 3.41 
 
 
Figure 10: Groups and contact between groups in the collective bargaining networks 
  
 
Note: Subgroups in the network are indicated by the blue field. Subgroups have been computed 
based on Louvain clustering with edge weighting, meaning that the nodes are randomly added and 
removed from clusters until an optimal solution is found. 
 
 
Coordination and potential for coordination in the collective bargaining process   
What now do the characteristics of the process of collective bargaining in the supermarket 
sector mean for coordination and coordination potential? As in the pharmaceutical 
industries, the vertical coordination at the trade union side stems from the yearly terms of 





demand of the FNV. Also, vertical coordination is observed when the central level FNV 
decided not to sign the collective agreement because it was not close enough to the 
standards set at the central level. Whether there is also vertical coordination at the 
employers’ side is less clear.  
There is also clear horizontal coordination taking place between trade unions and 
employers, between trade unions and between employers in their own groups. First of all, 
stemming from the renewal trajectory that preceded the process of collective bargaining 
and that set the terms and input for the process of negotiation. Also, the determination of 
the joined input for the negotiations between trade unions can be regarded as horizontal 
coordination as is the determination of joined input at the side of the employers. Finally, it 
could be the case that there is also some further coordination taking place between 
employers and trade unions through their representatives at the negotiation tables. After 
all, this study shows that there is quite some informal contact during the negotiation 
process, also between the different parties. This contact raises the potential for 
coordination. Whether this is actually the case depends on what is being discussed and how 
it is done: is it an extension of the negotiations or rather coordination that takes place in 





The selection of cases, the pharmaceutical industries and the supermarket sector, provided 
for the Netherlands two very different contexts to study. Here we compare the two sectors 
in terms of type of networks, collective bargaining process, the roles of trade unions and 
employers and the relationships between them and the coordination prevalent. 
 The most important difference between the two industries is that in the 
supermarket sector there are sectoral level collective agreements in place, whereas in the 
pharmaceutical industries only company levels collective agreements are present. These 
very different contexts are reflected in the networks. In the supermarket sector the network 
covers the whole sector, whereas in the pharmaceutical industries the networks are limited 
to the context of individual companies. Having a sector with no sectoral collective 
agreement in place, allowed observing whether any attempts are there to align company 
collective agreements in such a sectoral context. We can conclude that these attempts are 
very limited. At the trade union side, there is no overlap in the negotiating persons between 
the various collective agreements in the sector. The horizontal coordination that is there in 
the pharmaceutical industries stems from the presence of a national employers’ 
organization representative that sits in or advices at most of the bargaining tables in the 
sector.  
 If we further compare the process of collective bargaining in the pharmaceutical 
industries and the supermarket sector, we learn that a standard process of collective 
bargaining in the Netherlands contains a number of formal rounds of bargaining, that are 
interrupted by “breaks” to talk more freely and off the record in a smaller group. In the 
margins of these central meetings, also get-togethers in small groups and one-on-one 
meetings take place either face-to-face or on the phone. These meetings mainly serve to 
smoothen the process and get it going again if it is stuck. If we compare this process, which 
is perceived as standard, to what it is like in other countries (see figure 11), we see that the 





meetings are rated as most important in the bargaining process. However, in Italy and 
Ireland, bilateral meetings are perceived as most essential to the process of collective 
bargaining.  
 If we compare the pharmaceutical industries and the supermarket sector in terms 
of network connections, we observe that where in the pharmaceutical industries the 
network connections between employers and trade union representatives are almost as 
dense as within the own group, this is different in the supermarket sector. Here the network 
connections within the own groups are more frequent than within the own group. This could 
be a result of the fact that the collective agreements in the supermarket sector are sectoral 
collective agreements whereas in the pharmaceutical industries it are company level 
agreements. However, it could also be the case that the relations between the two groups 
are of a different nature in both sectors. Interestingly enough, in the pharmaceutical 
industry the mean influence assigned to negotiators at the side of the trade unions is as 
high as the influence assigned to employer’ representatives.  In the supermarket sector the 
employer’ representatives are assigned more influence than trade union representatives. 
The latter situation is more in line with the observation that over the last decades the 
employers in the Netherlands have become more powerful relative to trade unions. This 
power disbalance is further increased by the regulation in the Netherlands that states that 
to close a collective agreement it is sufficient that one trade union signs it, no matter how 
small it is. It is even possible to extend it to the entire sector. This situation further 
undermines the power of trade unions. They can decide not to sign a collective agreement, 
but as long as another trade union is willing to do so the consequences are small, as is 
shown by our case study of the supermarket sector. This could be an explanation for the 
fact that the ‘fragmentation in representation’ is, unlike in the other countries (Italy, Spain, 
Ireland), in both sectors in the Netherlands seen as (one of) the biggest obstacles in the 
negotiation process 
 If we look at coordination taking place, we observe that in both sectors the central 
working conditions agendas of the trade unions are important for vertical coordination: they 
clearly influence the input for the negotiations and the case study of the supermarket sector 
shows that the agendas are reinforced by the central level if deemed necessary. Especially 
in the pharmaceutical industries, where company level collective agreements are present, 
the coordinating influence of mother companies is seen. If we look at horizontal 
coordination at the sectoral level, an important difference is between the two sectors is that 
the coordination in the supermarket sector takes place within the context of the collective 
bargaining of the sectoral collective agreement: trade unions align their input and 
employers and employer’ organizations do the same amongst themselves. Also, the 
renewal process that preceded the collective bargaining leads to coordination. This is not 
the case in the pharmaceutical industries. There is little to no coordination at trade union’s 
side among the various collective agreements in the sector. However, at employers’ side 
the presence of an AWVN advisor leads to some coordination. This seems to be the 
mechanism that underlies the pattern bargaining in the sector as the units of reference are 
other company collective agreements in the sector and most of those are negotiated more 



















This study provides a detailed analysis of the process of collective bargaining, the network 
of the people involved and what this means for coordination (potential) in two different 
sectors in the Netherlands: the pharmaceutical industries and the supermarket sector. The 
aims were twofold: 1) to get a better understanding of what collective bargaining looks like 
from a network perspective and what this means for coordination (potential) and 2) testing 
whether social network analysis is a useful tool to study collective bargaining.  
 To start with an evaluation of the latter. The most obvious difficulty we ran into when 
applying a social network approach was the high response rate required to have meaningful 
analyses. It was difficult to get everybody to respond to the questionnaire. Especially in the 
supermarket sector. Respondent had a hard time seeing the added value of the approach 
and therefore were reluctant to participate. Another problem we ran into, was the issue that 
especially vertical coordination takes place outside the immediate network in which the 
bargaining of collective agreements take place and was therefore not captured by the social 
network analyses itself. For example, coordination takes place through the yearly agenda’s 
set by the national level employers’ organizations and by each of the trade unions at the 
central level, the central wage demand of the FNV and by the mother companies of 
daughters of multinationals operating in the Netherlands. It was not an option to widen the 
boundaries of our network to capture this type of coordination, as the coordination is not 
really enacted by individuals (which can be included in the social network and can respond 
to the questionnaire), but rather by entities/bodies within organizations. All in all, we 
learned that the way we applied social network analysis in this study means we mainly 
























semi-structured interviews that were conducted helped to capture these elements and can 
therefore be regarded essential.    
 What the focus on social networks for the negotiation of collective agreements has 
brought us is a detailed insight in how the processes of coordination work on the most 
elemental level: in negotiation networks and between negotiating actors. First of all, it 
shows how aims and boundaries set at the central level by employers’ organizations, trade 
unions and mother companies find their way into the negotiation results, and how they are 
reinforced throughout the process (e.g.  the FNV not signing the supermarket collective 
agreement). Second, it shows how horizontal coordination, among employers, among 
unions and among these two groups together works in practice. Within the context of a 
single collective agreement, the coordination can be substantial. For example, if one looks 
at the renewal process that took place in the supermarket sector before the process of 
negotiation started, it shows that the outcomes of this process clearly coordinate the 
collective bargaining. It more or less determined the whole bargaining agenda. Moreover, 
by looking at the interactions between individuals we were able to see that quite a 
substantial part of the negotiation process takes place informally. Depending on what is 
being discussed during these informal meetings, this gives room for potential further 
coordination taking place during the bargaining process.  
 What this study has moreover shown us, is that individual influence of negotiators 
in the bargaining process does not stem from formal position alone. Other factors, turned 
out to be important as well. For example, for trade union representatives having a history 
with negotiating the collective agreement at hand was found a relevant determinant: the 
knowledge of the field and an acquaintanceship with other negotiators lead to a position of 
influence. For individual employers sitting in at the table of sectoral collective agreements, 
being a representative of a company with a strong market position was found an important 
determinant for influence. This study nevertheless shows us that the negotiators that are 
perceived as most powerful are not always those with the strongest position in the 
negotiation network. They probably do not need a strong position in the network because 
their power stems from different sources. However, it also means that the process might 
be influenced by others in the network that are very well connected to others as they are 
able to steer the negotiations towards certain directions through their one-on-one contacts: 
a more hidden and subtle source of influence.   
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